THE MAKING OF TAIWAN’S FOREIGN POLICY

IN THE POST-MARTIAL LAW ERA

BY

DENNIS VAN VRANKEN HICKEY

POLITICAL SCIENCE DEPARTMENT

SOUTHWEST MISSOURI STATE UNIVERSITY

SPRINGFIELD, MO 65804

SEPTEMBER 2003

This paper was prepared for the University of South Carolina’s 2003 Conference on Taiwan Issues, Holiday Inn Historical District, Charleston, South Carolina. September 5-7, 2003

            The Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan) has changed dramatically since the lifting of martial law and the island’s accompanying democratization.  So, too, has Taiwan’s foreign policy.  The changes associated with democratization, and their consequences, raise important questions concerning the making of Taiwan’s foreign policy.  How will foreign policy be made?  What will be the role of the president, the bureaucracy, the Legislative Yuan and non-governmental actors?  How does foreign policy making in the post-martial law period compare to policy making during the eras of Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo?

            The purpose of this study is to provide an introduction to Taiwan’s foreign policy making process in the post-martial law period.  Primary emphasis is placed upon what Kenneth Waltz describes as the “second image” in foreign policy analysis.[1]  Namely, the paper examines the characteristics of the Taiwanese government, its political institutions and society and how these variables influence the crafting of foreign policy.[2] In addition, the paper discusses some of the many policy problems that have accompanied political liberalization in Taiwan.  In conclusion, the author suggests that democratization is proving to be a double-edged sword—it holds both challenges and opportunities for Taipei’s foreign policy.

I.  POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

When discussing the making of American foreign policy, a political scientist once observed that “the pieces of the foreign policy package are scattered all over town.”  This observation applies with special force to foreign policy decision making in Taipei.  As discussed below, numerous institutions now play a role in shaping Taiwan’s foreign policy.

A.  The President

During the Chiang era in Taiwan (1949-1988), the president of the ROC exercised almost unlimited power over both domestic and foreign policy.[3]   Other actors played a very circumscribed role in the policy making process.  Major decisions were made after consultation with a small number of trustworthy senior advisers, military officers and high officials within the ruling Kuomintang (KMT).  Once a decision was made, the state apparatus and the KMT implemented it faithfully.  Under this authoritarian system, criticism was not encouraged.  Indeed, the Legislative Yuan was little more than a “rubber stamp.”

With the lifting of martial law in 1987, things began to change. Emergency decrees and provisions that had granted the president almost unlimited powers were repealed. When crafting policy, Lee Teng-hui, Chiang Chiing-kuo’s successor, relied less upon KMT party stalwarts and military officers and more upon personal assistants, friends and associates. Moreover, during the Lee era (1988-2000) the government’s legislative bodies were revitalized and the Constitution was amended in such a way as to significantly modify the powers of the president.

Under the ROC Constitutional revisions of 1991, Taiwan’s president is popularly elected for a four-year term.  The president shares power with an appointed premier and cabinet.  Should a majority of lawmakers disagree with the policies pursued by the premier, they may initiate a vote of no confidence against the premier.  At this point, the president may either appoint a new premier or dismiss the legislature and call for elections.  Absent a vote of no confidence, however, the president cannot dismiss the legislature and call for elections.  The new system appears to work fairly smoothly when a president’s party enjoys control over a majority of the seats in the Legislative Yuan.  However, if an opposition party controls the legislature, a president may confront gridlock and seemingly endless partisan bickering.  This problem became a major concern during the first years of the Chen Shui-bian administration.[4]

With respect to international relations, the president of the ROC possesses numerous powers.  In the most general sense, he is responsible for developing the ROC’s foreign policy goals, objectives and strategies, outlining the basic principles of national security and setting the direction and tone of cross-strait relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC).[5]  The president also exercises, “the powers of concluding treaties, declaring war and making peace” and represents the ROC in foreign relations.[6]  Finally, the president is responsible for appointing a variety of officials including the premier, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and high-ranking military officers and defining the foreign policy responsibilities, if any, of the vice president.

A number of foreign policy initiatives have been launched during the post-martial law period in Taiwan.  Perhaps foremost among President Lee Teng-hui’s accomplishments was the creation of “pragmatic diplomacy.”   Shortly after being sworn in as president of the ROC in January 1988, Lee began to promote a “pragmatic approach” to international relations.  Pragmatic diplomacy calls for:

·         The advancement and reinforcement of formal diplomatic ties

·         The development of substantive relations with countries that do not maintain formal relations with Taiwan

·         Admission or readmission to international organizations and activities vital to the country’s national interest.

 Taipei’s controversial drive to return to the UN, moves to upgrade ties with nations that recognize the PRC and other efforts to enhance the island’s international stature may be traced to President Lee’s bold initiative.  It is noteworthy that pragmatic diplomacy remains as the cornerstone of Taiwan’s approach to foreign policy.

            On March 18, 2000, Chen Shui-bian was elected as the tenth president of the ROC.  The election was especially significant as it marked the first time that an opposition candidate had won a presidential election in Taiwan. When developing foreign policy, a wide range of experts and authorities within the office of the president are available for consultations.  Like his predecessor, however, President Chen reportedly relies upon a small group of trusted advisors.  Moreover, after initially seeking to distance himself from party politics, the president resumed the position as chair of his party in an effort to enhance party cohesion and support for his programs within the legislature.[7]

As described, President Chen continues to embrace pragmatic diplomacy. At the same time, however, he has sought to chart his own course in foreign policy.  For example, Chen has pushed Taiwan’s foreign policy establishment to be creative.  He has called on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) to be more supportive of Taiwanese efforts to participate in non-governmental organizations and to find ways to encourage parliamentary diplomacy, party-to-party diplomacy and other alternatives to traditional diplomacy.

The president has also pledged to put an end to the KMT’s long-standing practice of “dollar diplomacy”—a policy whereby Taiwan bribes small countries to remain loyal diplomatic allies.[8]  Parris Chang, an influential Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) legislator, has declared that “we will say no to any country that demands financial aid in exchange for the maintenance of diplomatic relations.”[9]  As an alternative to financial payoffs, President Chen has stressed that Taiwan should provide foreign nations with missions that improve medical conditions, particularly with regard to HIV/AIDS and malaria.[10]  Despite such rhetoric, however, it appears that Taipei still engages in some forms of dollar diplomacy.[11]

 Finally, President Chen has sought to boost Taiwan’s international standing by visiting numerous countries. Perhaps most significant was his “rest” in New York City and Houston while en route to Central America in May, 2001.  President Chen met with Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and twenty American legislators during a three-day stay in New York City and enjoyed a barbecue with Representative Tom DeLay (R.-Texas) during a visit to Texas. The Chen visit helped pave the way for a steady stream of high-ranking Taiwanese officials to journey to the US.  Recent Taiwanese engaged in “visit diplomacy” have included Vice President Annette Lu, Defense Minister Tang Yiau-ming, Wu Shu-chen (the president’s wife) and a host of lawmakers and politicians.  As one DPP lawmaker boasted, “President Chen has been very active in enhancing Taiwan’s profile internationally. I think he has been more active than any of his predecessors in traveling and exchanges with others.”[12]

B.  The Premier

The premier of the ROC is the highest official in the Executive Yuan, the institutional branch of the ROC government that administers all the major ministries, councils and administrations.  In keeping with President Chen’s calls to streamline, reorganize and reduce the size of the central government, the Executive Yuan will be downsized in 2004 to include fifteen ministries, six councils and two administrations (see Tables I, II and III).[13]  Some actors involved in the foreign policy process will be eliminated.  For example, the Government Information Office (GIO), whose responsibilities include the dissemination of propaganda overseas, is among the governmental bodies slated for elimination (its foreign affairs duties will be assumed by the MOFA).[14]  Overall, it is estimated that the number of civil servants will be slashed by 6.4 percent or 14,257 people.[15]  However, even a cursory glance at the tables below reveals that many of the remaining governmental agencies share some foreign policy making duties.

Table I: Executive Yuan Ministries After Reorganization

Source: “Taiwanese Cabinet Agrees on Proposal for Government Reorganization,” Central News Agency, April 24, 2002, in BBC Monitoring International Reports, April 25, 2002, in Lexis/Nexis.

  Table II: Executive Yuan Councils After Reorganization

Source: “Taiwanese Cabinet Agrees on Proposal for Government Reorganization,” Central News Agency, April 24, 2002, in BBC Monitoring International Reports, April 25, 2002, in Lexis/Nexis.

Table III: Executive Yuan Administrations After Reorganization

Source: “Taiwanese Cabinet Agrees on Proposal for Government Reorganization,” Central News Agency, April 24, 2002, in BBC Monitoring International Reports, April 25, 2002, in Lexis/Nexis.

In addition to presiding over the Executive Yuan, the premier may serve as a key adviser to the president and play an important role in matters relating to foreign policy.[16]  His influence, however, is largely dependent upon his personal relationship with the president.  Should the president approve, the premier may also serve as a chief foreign policy spokesperson.  For example, in 2002 the somewhat complicated and sensitive task of explaining why Mongolia would no longer be considered as a part of the ROC fell to Premier Yu Shyi-kun.[17]

C.  The National Security Council

Like its counterpart in the US, Taiwan’s National Security Council (NSC) was established to serve as an advisory body to the ROC president in matters relating to security and defense.  Formal members include the president, vice president, premier, minister of national defense, minister of foreign affairs, minister of economic affairs, and the director of the mainland affairs council.  The NSC is supported by a secretariat and also has a small support staff.

In addition to its advisory role, the NSC is charged with the responsibility of overseeing the operations of other organizations related to national security, including the National Security Bureau.  In practice, however, the NSC rarely meets and “as a body is not a major actor in the national security policy process and in particular has very little influence over defense-related matters.”[18]

D.  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the organization is responsible for conducting “the nation’s foreign affairs and related matters with its main purpose [being] to preserve and protect the nation’s interests.”[19]  In addition to the standard duties associated with the everyday maintenance of formal and substantive relations with foreign states, the MOFA has a number of other responsibilities.

The MOFA is expected to implement and support the president’s foreign policy initiatives. For example, the MOFA has launched a series of measures designed to comply with President Chen’s calls for the advancement of “people’s diplomacy” or “people-to-people-diplomacy.”  The MOFA also operates training schools for those involved in foreign affairs.  In 2002, students from over a dozen different governmental agencies enrolled in the MOFA’s Foreign Service Institute.[20]   Finally, the minister of the MOFA sometimes serves as a key foreign policy adviser to the president and premier.  From time to time, the minister will unveil diplomatic goals for the nation and specific objectives for the MOFA. It is believed that his role in national security matters, however, is quite limited.[21]

E.  The Ministry of National Defense and General Staff Headquarters

According to Article 137 of ROC Constitution, “the national defense of the ROC shall have as its objective the safeguarding of national security and the preservation of world peace.”[22]  The Ministry of National Defense (MND) is headed by a minister “who directs and oversees the national defense system formed by the three systems responsible for military administration, military command, and military armament.”[23]  The defense minister (who must be a civilian by law) may potentially exert significant “influence over the setting of both national security strategy and defense policy through his interactions with the president (as commander-in-chief and head of state) and the premier (as head of the executive branch).[24]  The MND as a whole, however, does not play a leading role in shaping the island’s overall national security strategy.  Rather, this is responsibility of the president.

The General Staff Headquarters (GSH) is housed within the MND and functions as its “military command staff and the command institution for joint operations of the ROC armed forces.”[25]  Like the MND, the GSH’s influence in the decision-making process is wielded primarily by the individual in charge of the organization—the Chief of the General Staff (CGS).  The CGS may make recommendations to the president about force levels, the allocation of defense resources, the defense budget and other matters related to national defense.

F.  The Legislative Yuan

As described, during the Chiang era the Legislative Yuan served as little more than a rubber stamp.  For many years, a majority of lawmakers were mainlanders who had fled China along with Chiang Kai-shek in 1949.  Like the “old thieves” who occupied the National Assembly, they were determined to hold onto their seats for life and seldom, if ever, questioned government policy. With democratization and the passage of time, however, all of this has changed.

According to Article 63 of the ROC Constitution, “the Legislative Yuan shall have the power to decide by resolution upon statutory or budgetary bills concerning martial law, amnesty, declaration of war, conclusion of peace or treaties and other important affairs of state.”[26]  Moreover, Article 57 stipulates that lawmakers “shall have the right to question the president and the ministers and chairmen of Commissions of the Executive Yuan.”[27]   Since democratization, Taiwan’s lawmakers have exhibited a strong determination to wield these powers.

Beginning during the Lee Teng-hui era (and continuing to this day), Taiwanese lawmakers have played an increasingly important role in the foreign policy making process. For example, it is now common practice for lawmakers to grill various ministers and officials from the Executive Yuan about foreign policy.  Even the premier is regularly called upon to explain and/or defend governmental policy.   Moreover, approval of expensive foreign policy projects—particularly major defense outlays—is no longer automatic and the practice of “dollar diplomacy” has proved to be especially unpopular.  Finally, some lawmakers have sought to play a role in lauching foreign policy initiatives.  For example, the recent campaign to upgrade the names of Taiwan’s overseas representative offices was initiated by a group of DPP lawmakers.[28]

G.  Other Governmental Actors

The discussion above includes only the major governmental actors that play a role in shaping Taiwan’s foreign policy.  A more complete discussion would include other institutions as well.  For example, the National Security Bureau (NSB) serves as the ROC’s chief intelligence agency.  As such, it wields little direct influence over the policy making process or the implementation of policy.  Nevertheless, the NSB provides the president and other key government officials with intelligence that can influence the policy-making process.[29]  Moreover, several agencies contribute to the making of economic policy.  The Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, the Central Bank of China and the Council for Economic Planning and Development all play a role in the development and implementation of Taiwan’s economic policies, including those related to foreign trade and investment.  In short, the democratization of Taiwan has opened the doors for many parts of the government to influence the foreign policy making process.

II.  NEW ACTORS IN THE FOREIGN POLICY PROCESS

            President Chen Shui-bian has called on Taiwan’s foreign policy establishment to help “usher in a new spring” in the country’s diplomatic efforts.[30]  The Chen administration contends that creative means of diplomacy must be employed if Taiwan is to successfully circumvent the growing economic, political and military power of the PRC.  Hsiao Bi-khim, a DPP lawmaker, explains:

They [the Taiwanese] are trying to find alternatives. When one door is closed to them, then they will find another door. That is why the government has been very active in advocating different levels of diplomacy—not just traditional state-to-state diplomacy, but also parliamentary, party-to-party and non-governmental organization interactions. All of this requires not just government efforts but also the involvement of society at large.[31]

The discussion below provides a brief overview of Taiwan’s recent efforts to increase the use of unconventional diplomatic tactics in foreign affairs.

A.  Inter-Parliamentary Diplomacy

The Chen administration did not give birth to the idea of inter-parliamentary diplomacy.[32] When running for president in 2000, however, Chen Shui-bian raised the idea of accelerating the use of this novel approach to international relations in his foreign policy white paper.  The initiative is beginning to yield some dividends.

Following Taiwan’s democratization, the island’s popularly elected lawmakers began to “become fully involved in international activities, including exchanges with foreign counterparts.”[33]  The inspiration for such activity is the hope that increased contacts and personal connections with foreign lawmakers may ultimately garner additional support for Taiwan.  As Parris Chang explained, “other countries such as the US and Japan may not attach much importance to inter-parliamentary diplomacy, but Taiwan is different because we have official relations with a mere 28 states.”[34]

Inter-parliamentary diplomacy has contributed to a string of small victories for Taipei.  For example, the US Congress has passed a series of pro-Taiwan resolutions and laws, including a controversial demand that the George W. Bush administration treat Taiwan as a non-NATO ally.[35]  Taiwanese lawmakers also played an important role in convincing American lawmakers to establish a new bi-partisan, pro-Taiwan association in the US Congress—the Taiwan Caucus.

The activities of Taiwan’s parliamentarians are not limited only to the US.  Their efforts also have yielded dividends in Europe.  The European Parliament, the only popularly elected legislative body that represents all the citizens of the European Union’s 15 member states, has passed a variety of pro-Taiwan resolutions.  These range from demands that China remove the roughly 350 missiles it has deployed directly opposite Taiwan to pleas for the international community to support Taiwan’s bid for membership in the World Health Organization (WHO).[36]

B.  Party-to Party-Diplomacy

Party-to-party diplomacy may be defined as “Taiwan’s political parties forging friendly relations with their foreign counterparts, particularly those of similar ideological outlook and joining in inter-party organizations.”[37]  The use of the practice as a means by which Taiwan can achieve its diplomatic goals has accelerated during the Chen administration.

During the martial law era, the KMT forged strong ties with many of the overseas Chinese communities.  In fact, branch offices of the party were established in numerous “Chinatowns.”  Through its many and varied activities, the KMT sought to bolster support among the overseas Chinese communities for the Chiang regime.

Following democratization, most of Taiwan’s political parties have sought to develop linkages with individuals and groups in foreign countries.  In a notable departure from past practice, these activities are not limited solely to garnering support of the overseas Chinese.  The parties also seek to establish strong ties with foreign political parties.  By the late 1990s, the KMT “had developed various degrees of friendly relations with 120 political parties in 60 countries, taking particular interest in the US Republican Party, Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party, Britain’s Conservative Party and the German Christian Democratic Party Union.”[38]  The DPP has followed a similar course of action, establishing friendly bonds with dozens of more liberal or progressive political organizations.

In some instances, Taiwan’s major political parties join together to send delegations to meet with members of a foreign political party.  For example, in December 2002, a nine-person delegation consisting of representatives from Taiwan’s four largest political parties journeyed to Bangkok to engage in a bout of “party diplomacy.”[39] Interestingly, both the KMT and DPP now send representatives to observe the Democratic and Republican presidential conventions in the US.

By developing strong ties with political parties in foreign countries, Taiwan’s parties hope to be able to draw upon a reservoir of support should a need for assistance arise.  There is evidence to support this view.  Taiwan does enjoy deep support among a wide range of foreign political parties—particularly America’s political parties.  But even minor Taiwanese parties have discovered that their counterparts overseas will support the country if threatened by China.  For example, when the PRC conducted a series of provocative “missile tests” off Taiwan’s coastline in 1996, Taiwan’s Green Party appealed to the European Federation of Green Parties for support.  The Greens sympathized with Taiwan’s plight and sent a member of its executive committee to the island in a show of solidarity.[40]  As one Taiwanese academic observed, the incident proved that “political parties, whether in power or not, should pursue inter-party diplomacy.”[41]  

C.  Non-Governmental Organizations

            International organizations are often divided into two broad categories—inter-governmental international organizations (IGOs) and non-governmental international organizations (NGOs). Taiwan has confronted its greatest challenges when attempting to join or rejoin IGOs.  The PRC goes to great lengths to block Taiwan’s participation in these institutions.  Beijing claims that the ROC is not a government (it reasons that the ROC  ceased to exist when the government moved from Nanjing to Taipei in 1949) and that only the PRC has the right to represent the Taiwanese people in international affairs.  Nevertheless, the PRC has grudgingly acquiesced to Taiwan’s membership in some IGOs—particularly those with an economic focus.  Perhaps most noteworthy is Taiwan’s participation in the World Trade Organizations (WTO) as an “economy” (the Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Jimmen and Matsu). But Taiwan’s attempts to join (or rejoin) most important IGOs have met with little success.   For example, the highly visible campaign to return to the UN has been stalled ever since it was launched in 1991.

            As opposed to the frustrating experiences with IGOs, the Taiwanese enjoy much greater degrees of success when seeking to join NGOs.  The Chen administration has seized upon the idea of increased NGO participation as a means by which the island’s people can help raise Taiwan’s international profile and ultimately help the government achieve its diplomatic goals.  Consequently, the MOFA established a NGO Affairs Committee in 2000 to assist Taiwanese NGOs wishing to participate in international activities.  By the end of 2001, the Committee “had already approved 387 grant applications from Taiwan’s NGOs to hold international events, meetings and conferences in Taiwan or to travel to participate in such activities overseas; in addition, when necessary, it facilitated visa processing for these activities.”[42]  The Committee has also coordinated NGO participation in humanitarian relief projects and sponsored training camps and internships for NGO workers.

            As of 2002, the Taiwanese participated in over 1,000 NGOs.  As outlined in Table IV (below) these organizations engage in a wide variety of activities ranging from science and technology to religion.

            In sum, NGOs are viewed as a vital part of the drive to use unconventional diplomatic tactics to achieve foreign policy goals. As Eugene Chien, Taiwan’s foreign minister, observed, it is “crucial for all the people of Taiwan to engage in diplomatic work.”[43] It is believed that many of Taiwan’s NGOs are actively engaged in such activities.  For example, in January 2001, the Taiwan International Medical Alliance was established by a group of medical professionals.  The organization has one key objective—to help Taipei achieve its long-standing goal of becoming a member of the WHO.[44]

Table IV:  Taiwanese Membership in NGOs

Source: The Republic of China Yearbook:  Taiwan 2002 (Taipei:  Government Information Office, 2002), p.127.

D.  Summary

In 2002, Parris Chang appeared to reflect the opinions of many Taiwanese when he repeated the old adage that “diplomacy is too important to be left to the diplomats.”[45]  By employing a variety of unconventional diplomatic tactics that fall under the broad rubric of “people-to-people diplomacy,” Taipei is seeking, with some degree of success, to boost its international profile and improve relations with foreign nations.  Thus far, the PRC has done little to block these moves.  Rather, Beijing seems to be borrowing a page from Taipei and attempting to use similar strategies to promote its own foreign policy agenda.  For example, like Taiwan’s major parties, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has sought to establish relations with America’s political parties.  Thus far, however, the CCP’s efforts have been stymied.

It is noteworthy that, unlike China, Taiwan’s non-state actors are, for the most part, actually non-state actors.[46]  As such, they do more than simply try to help the ROC government implement policy.  Taiwan’s business community, for example, has pressured the government to increase links with China while resisting calls that it invest primarily in Southeast Asia (the so-called “go-south policy”).  As the island’s NGOs, political parties and parliamentarians seek to influence policy, they do not always support the national government’s position on a given foreign policy issue.

III.  ANALYSIS

Democratization holds numerous benefits both for a nation and the global community as a whole.   As Strobe Talbottt observed, “democracies are demonstrably more likely to maintain their international commitments, less likely to engage in terrorism or wreak environmental damage, and less likely to make war with each other.”[47]  Democratization also holds the potential to “help countries modernize their economies, ameliorate social conditions, and integrate with the outside world.”[48]  Finally, democratic governments are “more inclined than their authoritarian or totalitarian predecessors to adopt policies that benefit their people …[and] have an important source of legitimacy.”[49]

            With respect to foreign policy, democratization has generated a number of positive outcomes for Taiwan.  The decision-making process is now much more transparent and open to public scrutiny than during the martial law era.  Moreover, with the lifting of martial law in 1987, questions began to be raised about Taiwan’s foreign policy.  Foreign policy issues are now subject to widespread discussion and debate and the island’s voters hold decision-makers accountable for their actions.  Furthermore, many new actors have been brought into the policy-making process.  In addition to the president, the “players” in Taiwan’s foreign policy making “game” now include a handful of ministries and councils, the Legislative Yuan, political parties, parliamentarians, NGOs, interest groups, the news media and an assortment of other actors.  Finally, democratization has bolstered support at both the popular and elite levels for Taiwan among the US and many other western democracies.[50]  But there is another side to this coin.

            In his classic study of American society, Alexis de Tocqueville wrote that “especially in their conduct of foreign relations, democracies appear to me decidedly inferior to other governments.”[51]  Democracies tend to “obey impulse rather than prudence,” display a tendency to “abandon a mature design for the gratification of a momentary passion,” and are deficient in many of the qualities demanded by effective foreign policy.[52]  To survive in an anarchic international system a state must often act with speed, secrecy and decisiveness in foreign policy.  For a nation like the ROC, a country confronted by a powerful foe determined to engineer its demise as a sovereign state, the difficulties posed by democratization are particularly acute.

            It is clear that, to a considerable degree, Taiwan’s foreign policy suffers from a lack of cohesion and unity of purpose during the post-marital law period.  Policy-making appears uncoordinated within the Executive Yuan and there is evidence suggesting that the numerous ministries responsible for developing and implementing policy now feel free to pursue their own organizational interests and undermine policies that they do not support.  For example, according to some accounts, President Chen had to cancel a planned journey to Indonesia in 2002 because a department within the government sabotaged the visit.[53]  His predecessor, Lee Teng-hui, felt compelled to move much of the decision-making process into the Office of the President because he could not trust the foreign policy bureaucracy.

            As William Quandt observed, “in a democratic polity, foreign policy is inevitably influenced by domestic realities.”[54]  As the leader of a democratic country, Taiwan’s president must consider public opinion in the making of foreign policy, not only for legitimacy reasons, but also for political considerations.  In fact, during his 2000 inaugural address, Chen Shui-bian declared that “the government must rule on the basis of majority public opinion [emphasis added].”

            Ever since martial law was lifted in 1987, Taiwanese politicians have claimed to follow public opinion when developing both domestic and foreign policy.  Public opinion polls are cited routinely as a critical factor in determining policy toward China, defense issues (including Taiwan’s participation in a theater missile defense system), the overseas visits of ROC officials, the drive to return to the UN and a host of other important issues.  The MOFA even sought to explain the recent decision to add the name “Taiwan” to the cover of passports by claiming that nine public opinion polls showed support for the move.[55]  However, studies have long acknowledged that it is unwise for decision-makers to base foreign policy decisions on the whims of public opinion.

            Like their counterparts in other democracies, many Taiwanese are unfamiliar with the complexities of foreign policy issues.  For example, when President Bill Clinton unveiled his “three no’s” policy toward Taiwan in 1995, public opinion polls revealed most Taiwanese opposed the policy.  However, polls also showed that a majority of respondents did not understand the meaning of the policy.

There are other problems associated with public opinion polls in Taiwan.  Many Taiwanese, particularly those individuals who reside in the countryside, refuse to answer polls truthfully. Moreover, numerous polls are flawed methodologically—either intentionally or unintentionally.  Candidates, political parties, the media and even governmental agencies have manipulated polls to achieve desired results.  These developments led one political scientist at National Chengchi University to complain that “Taiwan’s public opinion research environment has become polluted.” [56]

            As described, the Chen administration has encouraged numerous elements within Taiwanese society to get more involved in foreign policy.  In actual practice, however, peope-to-people diplomacy sometimes undermines government policy.  A case in point is the 2002 visit by a group of KMT lawmakers to Washington, D.C.  The legislators lobbied against President Chen’s position toward the thorny “one China” question and informed their American counterparts that the DPP position on national referendums did not reflect public opinion in Taiwan.  As one academic observed, “by bringing their differences of opinion to the US, these lawmakers totally embarrassed Taiwan.”[57]  Much to its chagrin, the ROC government also has discovered that the PRC is seeking to use elements of Taiwanese society as a “fifth column” of support.  President Chen has complained that “we have noticed recently that not only do they [China] apply such methods through businesses [but] they have also been reaching out to political parties and legislators.”[58]

            Finally, mention should be made of a tendency exhibited by both Taiwan’s legislature and news media to embarrass, humiliate and even undermine the national government and its foreign policy programs.  Some DPP legislators complain that opposition lawmakers—particularly members of the KMT—seek to “demonize” Taiwan’s diplomatic work for partisan political advantage.[59]  Indeed, independent studies have reached the conclusion that “the media and opposition politicians seem to have an unusual passion for exposing the government’s diplomatic tricks and an insatiable appetite for sensationalizing anything which smacks of secretiveness.”[60]

In sum, it is clear that democratization has complicated the foreign policy making process in Taiwan.  However, few Taiwanese want to return to the days of authoritarian rule.  They appear to agree with Winston Churchill’s observation that “democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the rest.”  Moreover, the challenges posed by democratization for Taiwan’s foreign policy should not be exaggerated.  After all, a consensus exists among a majority of Taiwanese, irrespective of political party affiliation, with respect to most foreign policy issues:

Many of the differences between the major parties consist largely of emphasis and tone…In specific areas of foreign policy and defense policy, the bulk of Taiwan’s political elite apparently agree on a wide range of basic principles and policy positions, reflecting the overall pragmatism and growing moderation of Taiwan’s dominant political center.[61]

In other words, a vast majority of the Taiwanese population support the many and varied elements of pragmatic diplomacy and the Chen administration’s recent moves to employ people-to-people diplomacy and other unconventional tactics to achieve the nation’s foreign policy goals.

IV.  CONCLUSION

As James N. Rosenau observed, there are numerous factors that will influence a state’s foreign policy behavior.[62] These include the external environment, the societal environment, the governmental setting, the roles of policy makers and the individual characteristics of the foreign policy-making elite.  When seeking to explain foreign policy actions, analysts must be cognizant of the fact that when “looking with hindsight at any past policy, assuming all of its antecedents are known, it is possible to see every act as fully determined by the totality of its antecedents.”[63] Indeed, as Sidney Verba noted, “no model and no theorist, no matter how committed to holistic principles, can encompass the totality of a situation.”[64]

            This study has sought to provide an introduction to Taiwan’s foreign policy making process in the post-martial law period.  Obviously, democratization is not the only factor—or perhaps even a critical determinant—when one seeks to explain how and why foreign policy decisions are made in Taiwan.  Indeed, the proposition that domestic politics might explain foreign policy stands in sharp contrast to the so-called realist tradition in the study of international relations. However, Taiwan’s democratization is certainly a contributing factor and one that merits further study and investigation.

            Taiwan’s foreign policy in the post-martial law era is rife with example of how the island’s political liberalization shapes its actions abroad.  This paper indicates that Taiwanese decision-makers are struggling to deal with the power diffusion associated with democratization while simultaneously seeking to employ it in such a way as to help the country persevere (or perhaps even prevail) in the struggle with its arch-rival across the Taiwan Strait.  However, whether or not Taiwan—the first true democracy in over 5,000 years of Chinese history—will succeed in this endeavor remains a matter of some speculation.