- Wage elasticity of the demand for labor =  $\eta_w$ 
  - What is the impact of the minimum wage on labor markets?
    - Recall that if the market is competitive then the wage increases, employment falls, and unemployment is created.
      - But how <u>much</u> does employment fall? Answering this question is the whole point of the wage elasticity of the demand for labor.
  - Definitions
    - $\eta_w$  = how responsive is the demand for labor to changes in wages.

• 
$$\eta = \frac{\%\Delta L}{\%\Delta W}$$

- What do we know about price elasticities and, hence,  $\eta_w?$ 
  - $\eta_w < 0$ . Why? Make sure you know.
  - If  $|\eta_w| > 1 \Rightarrow |\%\Delta L| > |\%\Delta W| \Rightarrow$  labor demand is wage <u>elastic</u>
  - If  $|\eta_w| < 1 \Rightarrow |\%\Delta L| < |\%\Delta W| \Rightarrow$  labor demand is wage <u>inelastic</u>
  - If  $|\eta_w| = 1 \Rightarrow |\%\Delta L| = |\%\Delta W| \Rightarrow$  labor demand is <u>unitary</u>
  - What do all of these mean?
  - What is  $\eta_w$  along a linear downward sloping demand curve?
- What makes a demand for labor relatively more or less elastic?
  - What do we mean by relatively more or less elastic? Show it graphically.
  - Four Hicks Marshall Laws of Derived Demand
    - Recall the two effects that occur when wage changes discussed in Labor demand material. The four laws relate to these two effects.
      - Scale effect w ↑ => costs of production ↑ => S of the good produced by labor ↓ => output produced ↓ => inputs used to produce the output ↓ => D<sub>L</sub> ↓
      - Substitution effect w  $\uparrow =>$  labor becomes more costly than its substitutes  $=> D_L \downarrow$  as the firm substitutes other inputs for it.
    - 1.  $\eta_w \uparrow (\downarrow)$  as the price elasticity of the demand for the product labor produces  $\uparrow (\downarrow)$ . Why? What are the implications?
    - 2.  $\eta_w \uparrow$  as it becomes easier to substitute other inputs for labor. Why? What are the implications?
    - 3.  $\eta_w \uparrow$  as the price elasticity of supply for other inputs  $\uparrow$ . Why? What are the implications?
    - 4.  $\eta_w \uparrow$  as the cost of labor as a share of total costs  $\uparrow$ . Why? Is this law always true?
- Empirical estimates of η<sub>w</sub>.
  - See Table 4.1 page 103 in the textbook

- What do the numbers mean?
- You should know the general results without memorizing the numbers explicitly.
- Application Unions
  - What do unions want? At least three possible goals.
    - 1. Increased income and power for union officials
    - 2. Increased wages for union members
    - 3. Increased union employment
    - The last two may cause the first goal to be met.
  - D/S theory says that 2 and 3 are mutually exclusive.
    - Why?
    - What if demand for labor is relatively inelastic => the tradeoff between wages and employment is not as severe. Why? Show it on a graph.
  - What can the union do to affect  $(\downarrow) \eta_w$  make demand labor less elastic?
    - Government policies the union might support?
    - Long term labor contracts
  - Other implications
    - As  $\eta_w \downarrow \Rightarrow$  union wages  $\uparrow$ , ceteris paribus, and the reverse.
    - Union labor organizers would tend to find labor markets with low  $\eta_w$  (highly inelastic  $D_L$ ) more desirable.
- Cross wage elasticity of the demand for labor.
  - Definitions
    - Demand for labor is affected by wages for other types of labor. Suppose two types of labor j and k. Then the cross wage elasticity for these two types of labor ( $\eta_{JK}$  or  $\eta_{KJ}$ ) equals how responsive demand for one type of labor is to changes in the wage of the other type.

• 
$$\eta_{JK} = \frac{\%\Delta L_J}{\%\Delta W_K}$$

• 
$$\eta_{KJ} = \frac{\%\Delta L_K}{\%\Delta W_J}$$

- What does the cross wage elasticity tell us? What does the number mean?
  - If we observe that  $\eta_{JK} > 0 \Rightarrow$  when  $W_K$  increases then  $L_J$  also increases (and the reverse)  $\Rightarrow J$  and K are gross substitutes. Why?
  - If we observe that  $\eta_{JK} < 0 \Rightarrow$  when  $W_K$  increases then  $L_J$  decreases (and the reverse)  $\Rightarrow J$  and K are gross complements. Why?
  - Recall the scale and substitution effect, but now as related to cross wage elasticities:

- Scale effect  $W_K \uparrow =>$  costs of production  $\uparrow =>$  S of the good produced by labor  $\downarrow =>$  output produced  $\downarrow =>$  inputs used to produce the output  $\downarrow => L_K \downarrow \text{ and } L_J \downarrow$
- Substitution effect  $W_K \uparrow => L_K$  becomes more costly than its substitute,  $L_J =>$  Firm substitutes  $L_J$  for  $L_K => L_K \downarrow$  while  $L_J \uparrow$ .
- Therefore two ways to observe gross complements ( $\eta_{JK} < 0$ ).
  - Jand K are actual substitutes but the substitution effect of an increase in  $W_K$ , which causes  $L_J$  to increase, is outweighed by the scale effect of an increase in the  $W_K$ , which causes  $L_J$  to decrease => overall we observe that as  $W_K$  increases then  $L_J$  decreases even though the two types of labor are actually substitutes.
  - J and K are actual complements. In this case there is no substitution effect. Thus, the scale effect of an increase in  $W_K$  causes  $L_J$  to decrease.
- Only observe that J and K are gross substitutes if (1) J and K are <u>actual</u> substitutes and (2) the substitution effect outweighs the scale effect.
- The above tells us that cross wage elasticities are determined by:
  - 1. Whether the two inputs are actual complements or actual substitutes and,
  - 2. The relative size of the substitute and scale effects. The relative sizes are affected by the 4 Hicks/Marshall laws discussed in the previous section.
  - Consider what affects the size of the scale effect (assume that the two types of labor are union and non-union labor.) As the scale effect increases, ceteris paribus, union and non-union labor are more likely to be gross complements (what does the union want?).
    - 1. The union share of total costs. As this increases, the scale effect is larger (why?)
    - 2. The price elasticity of demand for the good that is being produced. As this increases, the scale effect is larger (why?).
  - Consider what affects the size of the substitution effect. As the substitution effect increase, ceteris paribus, union and non-union labor are less likely to be gross complements (what does the union want?).
    - 1. How easy is it to substitute non-union for union labor? As it becomes easier, the substitution effect is larger. How might unions affect this?
    - 2. How price elastic is the supply of non-union labor? As it becomes more elastic the substitution effect is larger (why?) Can unions affect this?
- Why do we care about cross wage elasticities?
  - How does public policy depend upon cross wage elasticities?
  - Empirical Findings
    - 1. labor and energy are gross and actual substitutes (highly inelastic)
    - 2. labor and materials are gross and actual substitutes (again, highly inelastic)
    - 3. skilled and unskilled labor probably substitutes
    - 4. Not sure if either skilled or unskilled labor is substitute or complement to capital.
    - 5. Skilled labor is more likely to be complement to capital than unskilled labor. (Why does this matter?)

- Should we have a minimum wage? Public policy analysis of the impacts of minimum wage laws.
  - Empirical summary of facts presented in class/book
  - Theory what happens to employment with an increase in the wage (minimum wage)?
    - L decreases (law of demand)
    - What does this impact have to do with elasticity? Focus on total wage income  $w^{*}L = I$ 
      - If  $|\eta_W| > 1$  (labor demand is wage elastic) =>  $|\%\Delta L| > |\%\Delta w| =>$  as  $w \uparrow I \downarrow$  (make sure you understand why)
      - If  $|\eta_W| < 1$  (labor demand is wage inelastic) =>  $|\%\Delta L| < |\%\Delta w| =>$  as  $w \uparrow I \uparrow$  (make sure you understand why)
      - Therefore the wage elasticity of the demand for labor speaks to effectiveness of the minimum wage law in making labor better off because of the increased minimum wage.
    - Complications of the analysis
      - This is nominal D<sub>L</sub> and nominal wage => inflation can mitigate employment losses (see Fig 4.3 in book)
      - Statistics as  $w \uparrow L \downarrow \underline{only}$  if other factors affecting employment are held constant (why is this a problem?)
    - The uncovered sector in minimum wage laws
      - What is the uncovered sector? (What percent of jobs are covered by minimum wage laws?)
      - Assume the following:
        - 1. 2 labor markets (sectors) covered and uncovered
        - 2. total employment in both is fixed but workers can move between them (the two markets are substitutes)
        - 3. without a minimum wage the same wage prevails in both markets (really one market)
      - Results = ? You should know the graphs we used in class to analyze the results and what happens to the following variables:
        - 1. wages and employment in the covered sector
        - 2.  $S_L$  for the uncovered sector
        - 3. wages and employment for the uncovered sector
      - Conclusions What impact does an uncovered sector have ultimately on the conclusion that minimum wage lowers employment and raises wages?
    - Empirical evidence regarding the impact of minimum wage laws
      - What is the evidence regarding the impact on wages and employment when first enacted in the 1930s?

- After 1930s, there is little consensus on the impact of a minimum wage on employment for unskilled labor. However evidence does indicate that  $\eta$  is probably smaller in absolute value for mandated wage changes like the minimum wage than for market based wage changes => evidence of monopsony power in labor markets (why?)
- Does increasing the minimum wage reduce poverty?
  - Recall that if demand for labor is inelastic, as found => as the minimum wage increases => total wage income (I) increases => should reduce poverty (shouldn't it?)
  - What is poverty? Defined by <u>household</u> not individual income. Below a set household income level, households are considered to be in poverty.
  - What is the empirical evidence? As the minimum wage increased (in 1990-1991) found that:
    - Only 22% of those individuals affected by the increase in the minimum wage (make sure you know what this means) lived in poverty.
    - Of households in poverty only 26% were affected by the increased minimum wage (why so few?)