The Republican
Tradition
From Oklahoma Populism: A
History of the People's Party in the Oklahoma Territory (Norman
and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987)
Reprinted in William F. Holmes (ed.), American Populism.
Problems in American Civilization Series. (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath &
Co., 1994)
The Populist Revolt was the product of the still-vital neo-republican
mind of the late nineteenth century as it evaluated the results of the
economic, political, and social revolutions of Gilded Age America.
Throughout the late nineteenth century, spokesmen representing a series
of egalitarian third-party movements put forth an apocalyptic critique
of the Gilded Age's cosmopolitan ethos that was rooted in the ideology
of the founding fathers. Third-party agitators were especially
successful in mobilizing a following where economic and political
conditions had discredited major-party spokesmen, as on the Great Plains
and in the cotton-belt South during the late 1880s and 1890s.
Whether the course of late-nineteenth-century development constituted an
advance of civilization or a degeneration toward barbarism became a
major point of contention in America with the coming of the Populist
revolt. Cosmopolitan elements looked back to the pronouncements of John
Locke, who elevated property rights to an equal place beside human
rights, for inspiration in judging contemporary events. These men
pointed to such material factors as increased wealth, expanded
production, and a proliferation of services as signs of the nation's
advance. They were, in essence, system-oriented. They saw the plight of
individual victims as a small price to pay for the significant advances
of the nation as a whole.
The republican ideal of the founding fathers, which informed the
Populists' assessment of late-nineteenth-century events, viewed the
protection of individual liberties as the ultimate goal of society. The
role of government was to promote social conditions that would aid the
individual's God-given right to self-fulfillment. This humanistic
orientation was moral in nature and based upon precepts of justice to
the individual. It dictated the rejection of any social development that
encouraged the debasement of any human. Such a viewpoint naturally had
special appeal to those who saw themselves as victims of the
contemporary system.
When railroads first appeared in a region, the almost universal response
was enthusiasm for the new commercial and industrial world. Farmers and
merchants alike wanted to believe that they were on the brink of the
sustained prosperity that the philosophies of laissez-faire capitalism
and social Darwinism promised. The more aggressive farmers bought
machinery, fertilizer, and more land, all on credit, and quickly
discovered that they were the most efficient producers of the age. Their
agricultural production vastly outpaced the purchasing capacity of other
Americans and even the world. Prices for agricultural commodities
naturally plummeted. Railroad operators and other middlemen, however,
took their profits regardless of the farmers' plight. In spite of this,
commercial elements proclaimed the emerging economic system just and
laid the blame for agrarian problems on the farmer. He overproduced,
they claimed. A crisis in agriculture occurred when mortgages were
numerous, credit was tight, and transportation costs were more
expensive.
As the economy of the Plains and the South worsened, farmers turned to
their elected officials for aid. Government had provided tariffs to
protect manufacturers, land grants to aid railroads, and deflation to
help creditors. But when farmers put forth their claims upon the
political process, they received little more than the worn out slogans
of laissez-faire. The inadequate response of the Gilded Age's political
elite to the plight of the farmer produced a political crisis in these
outlying regions of the nation.
Many southern and western farmers had never completely committed
themselves to the panaceas of Gilded Age enterprise. Although they had
entered the world of commercial agriculture, they were primarily family
farmers, not agribusinessmen. By the 1890s their operations often were
only marginally profitable. Diversification, however, saved them from
the worst effects of the late nineteenth century's agricultural crisis.
This reaffirmed their commitment to the more traditional agrarian ethos.
In the darkest days of the depression of the 1890s, many who had
committed themselves to the dominant ideology of the era began to have
second thoughts about their new commitment and searched for new answers.
Frequently they found the ideology of the People's party more rewarding.
The cyclical interpretation of social development that
late-nineteenth-century egalitarians inherited from the founding fathers
lent positive connotations to the simplicity, equality, industriousness,
and frugality of the developing society and a negative attitude to the
hedonism, luxury, venality, and exploitation of a developed nation.
Their Whiggish orientation caused them to see the latter as a triumph of
power over liberty....
Late-nineteenth-century egalitarians believed that the principles handed
down by the founding fathers were universal truths, valid for all times
and conditions. Many of the economic and social developments of the
Gilded Age, furthermore, appeared to be consistent with the inherited
warnings of social degeneration. Lawmakers seemed to abdicate their
responsibility for monetary policy to America's, and, worse yet,
England's, banker elite. Government policies, such as the protective
tariff and land grants to railroads, promoted the ultimate consolidation
of wealth and power -- monopoly. The gap between the rich and the poor
widened distinctly. The process also destroyed the independent family
farmer, the bulwark of liberty in a republic. Rather than using the
power of government to stem this spreading cancer, Populists believed
that America's Gilded Age political elite aided the process through
unneeded extravagance, financed by bonding schemes likely to force
future generations into economic dependence.
To return America to the path charted at the nation's founding,
late-nineteenth-century egalitarians devised a series of remedies that,
when combined, formed the Omaha platform of 1892. With the exception of
the Alliance's subtreasury plan, each demand cataloged in the document
had appeared in previous third-party manifestos. The People's party was
only the largest and most successful of a series of
late-nineteenth-century egalitarian movements that shared a common
spirit rooted in the republican ideology of the American Revolution....
In the national arena Populists looked to an active government as the
salvation of the nation. They called for elected representatives to
restore monetary policy to popular control and then to reverse the trend
toward concentrated wealth with the graduated income tax. Populists
called for greenbacks to reflate the currency and provide needed credit
in outlying regions of the nation. They favored postal-savings banks to
secure the deposits of average citizens, who often lost everything
through the speculations of bankers. Populist spokesmen also called for
government ownership of the railroads, telephones, and telegraphs. They
reasoned that such monopolies concentrated too much wealth and power in
the hands of the few. Although this solution seemed to contradict the
Populists' antipathy toward the proliferation of offices, returning the
American people to their egalitarian heritage and popular control would
make active government acceptable. To facilitate the return of popular
control, Populists also advocated direct democracy through the
initiative and referendum, plus popular election of the president and
senators. Where Adam Smith had feared the power of the government,
Populists feared the power of the few and saw popular control of an
active government as their savior....
Populist anti-elitism also manifested itself in other ways. Third-party
legislators generally opposed bills to professionalize what today are
called the "professions." They believed that such preference amounted to
granting a special franchise or establishing an aristocracy. More
important, however, Populists wished to deny the Gilded Age elite's
claim to special status. Such men were seen as wanting the government to
grant them monopoly status because of their superior advantages, namely
a better education....
How well most Populists understood the workings of the modem industrial
economy can be questioned. Some third-party advocates clearly realized
that many of the undesirable events in a modern industrial society
resulted from the impersonal workings of a complex economic system
rather than from conspiracies. Many others did not. Using the conspiracy
metaphor, however, Populists could label their opposition immoral, which
provided a stronger motivation for action than did appeals not invested
with moral overtones. Still, Populists were not unique in their
conspiracy mindedness. The so-called anarchist plots associated with the
agrarian and labor troubles of the late nineteenth century played an
equally important role in the minds of their cosmopolitan rivals, who
might have been expected to know better. Industrialism was in its
infancy, and most people struggled to understand the meaning of its
impact. In large part, accusations of conspiracy were simply the level
upon which politics was played in the 1890s.
Although Populists chose economic policy as their battlefield, morality
was their cause. They looked backward to an earlier moral order for
their inspiration. Populists did recognize, however, that commercial and
industrial society was a permanent part of the American landscape.
Instead of engaging in a frenzy of Luddite retrogression, they attempted
to address problems within the context of their morally based mind-set.
They accepted industrialism but demanded that it be made humane. The
adoption of many of their solutions in the twentieth century attests to
the practicality of their reforms. Populists wanted both the benefits of
industrialization and a moral social order.
Various scholars have noted the almost religious fervor of the Populist
appeal. For many, the People's party replaced the church as a vehicle
for moral expression. The apocalyptic vision of Populism, however,
encouraged a drive for quick victory. Third party disciples believed
that the crisis of the age was upon them in 1896. The result would be
either civilization or barbarism. Desperation caused many of Populism's
oldest and most noted leaders to temporize their positions and accept
the pragmatism of fusion with Democrats. Those not disheartened by this
transition from justice to expediency finally lost heart upon the defeat
of William Jennings Bryan.
The nomination of Bryan for president in 1896 saved the Democratic party
from going the way of the Whigs. Three major parties vied for the
allegiance of the American electorate in the 1890s. If men like Grover
Cleveland had controlled the Democratic party in 1896, the People's
party could well have replaced it as the GOP's major rival. If the
People's party had survived as a major force in the political life of
the nation, the American electorate would have been presented with a
continuing debate over its commitment to capitalism. Instead, the great
political debate of twentieth-century America has been over how best to
save capitalism.