The Populist Revolt was the product of the still-vital neo-republican mind of the late nineteenth century as it evaluated the results of the economic, political, and social revolutions of Gilded Age America. Throughout the late nineteenth century, spokesmen representing a series of egalitarian third-party movements put forth an apocalyptic critique of the Gilded Age's cosmopolitan ethos that was rooted in the ideology of the founding fathers. Third-party agitators were especially successful in mobilizing a following where economic and political conditions had discredited major-party spokesmen, as on the Great Plains and in the cotton-belt South during the late 1880s and 1890s.

Whether the course of late-nineteenth-century development constituted an advance of civilization or a degeneration toward barbarism became a major point of contention in America with the coming of the Populist revolt. Cosmopolitan elements looked back to the pronouncements of John Locke, who elevated property rights to an equal place beside human rights, for inspiration in judging contemporary events. These men pointed to such material factors as increased wealth, expanded production, and a proliferation of services as signs of the nation's advance. They were, in essence, system-oriented. They saw the plight of individual victims as a small price to pay for the significant advances of the nation as a whole.

The republican ideal of the founding fathers, which informed the Populists' assessment of late-nineteenth-century events, viewed the protection of individual liberties as the ultimate goal of society. The role of government was to promote social conditions that would aid the individual's God-given right to self-fulfillment. This humanistic orientation was moral in nature and based upon precepts of justice to the individual. It dictated the rejection of any social development that encouraged the debasement of any human. Such a viewpoint naturally had special appeal to those who saw themselves as victims of the contemporary system.

When railroads first appeared in a region, the almost universal response was enthusiasm for the new commercial and industrial world. Farmers and merchants alike wanted to believe that they were on the brink of the sustained prosperity that the philosophies of laissez-faire capitalism and social Darwinism promised. The more aggressive farmers bought machinery, fertilizer, and more land, all on credit, and quickly discovered that they were the most efficient producers of the age. Their agricultural production vastly outpaced the purchasing capacity of other Americans and even the world. Prices for agricultural commodities naturally plummeted. Railroad operators and other middlemen, however, took their profits regardless of the farmers' plight. In spite of this, commercial elements proclaimed the emerging economic system just and laid the blame for agrarian problems on the farmer. He overproduced, they claimed. A crisis in agriculture occurred when mortgages were numerous, credit was tight, and transportation costs were more expensive.

As the economy of the Plains and the South worsened, farmers turned to their elected officials for aid. Government had provided tariffs to protect manufacturers, land grants to aid railroads, and deflation to help creditors. But when farmers put forth their claims upon the political process, they received little more than the worn out slogans of laissez-faire. The inadequate response of the Gilded Age's political elite to the plight of the farmer produced a political crisis in these outlying regions of the nation.

Many southern and western farmers had never completely committed themselves to the panaceas of Gilded Age enterprise. Although they had entered the world of commercial agriculture, they were primarily family farmers, not agribusinessmen. By the 1890s their operations often were only marginally profitable. Diversification, however, saved them from the worst effects of the late nineteenth century's agricultural crisis. This reaffirmed their commitment to the more traditional agrarian ethos. In the darkest days of the depression of the 1890s, many who had committed themselves to the dominant ideology of the era began to have second thoughts about their new commitment and searched for new answers. Frequently they found the ideology of the People's party more rewarding.

The cyclical interpretation of social development that late-nineteenth-century egalitarians inherited from the founding fathers lent positive connotations to the simplicity, equality, industriousness, and frugality of the developing society and a negative attitude to the hedonism, luxury, venality, and exploitation of a developed nation. Their Whiggish orientation caused them to see the latter as a triumph of power over liberty....

Late-nineteenth-century egalitarians believed that the principles handed down by the founding fathers were universal truths, valid for all times and conditions. Many of the economic and social developments of the Gilded Age, furthermore, appeared to be consistent with the inherited warnings of social degeneration. Lawmakers seemed to abdicate their responsibility for monetary policy to America's, and, worse yet, England's, banker elite. Government policies, such as the protective tariff and land grants to railroads, promoted the ultimate consolidation of wealth and power -- monopoly. The gap between the rich and the poor widened distinctly. The process also destroyed the independent family farmer, the bulwark of liberty in a republic. Rather than using the power of government to stem this spreading cancer, Populists believed that America's Gilded Age political elite aided the process through unneeded extravagance, financed by bonding schemes likely to force future generations into economic dependence.

To return America to the path charted at the nation's founding, late-nineteenth-century egalitarians devised a series of remedies that, when combined, formed the Omaha platform of 1892. With the exception of the Alliance's subtreasury plan, each demand cataloged in the document had appeared in previous third-party manifestos. The People's party was only the largest and most successful of a series of late-nineteenth-century egalitarian movements that shared a common spirit rooted in the republican ideology of the American Revolution....

In the national arena Populists looked to an active government as the salvation of the nation. They called for elected representatives to restore monetary policy to popular control and then to reverse the trend toward concentrated wealth with the graduated income tax. Populists called for greenbacks to reflate the currency and provide needed credit in outlying regions of the nation. They favored postal-savings banks to secure the deposits of average citizens, who often lost everything through the speculations of bankers. Populist spokesmen also called for government ownership of the railroads, telephones, and telegraphs. They reasoned that such monopolies concentrated too much wealth and power in the hands of the few. Although this solution seemed to contradict the Populists' antipathy toward the proliferation of offices, returning the American people to their egalitarian heritage and popular control would make active government acceptable. To facilitate the return of popular control, Populists also advocated direct democracy through the initiative and referendum, plus popular election of the president and senators. Where Adam Smith had feared the power of the government, Populists feared the power of the few and saw popular control of an active government as their savior....

Populist anti-elitism also manifested itself in other ways. Third-party legislators generally opposed bills to professionalize what today are called the "professions." They believed that such preference amounted to granting a special franchise or establishing an aristocracy. More important, however, Populists wished to deny the Gilded Age elite's claim to special status. Such men were seen as wanting the government to grant them monopoly status because of their superior advantages, namely a better education....

How well most Populists understood the workings of the modem industrial economy can be questioned. Some third-party advocates clearly realized that many of the undesirable events in a modern industrial society resulted from the impersonal workings of a complex economic system rather than from conspiracies. Many others did not. Using the conspiracy metaphor, however, Populists could label their opposition immoral, which provided a stronger motivation for action than did appeals not invested with moral overtones. Still, Populists were not unique in their conspiracy mindedness. The so-called anarchist plots associated with the agrarian and labor troubles of the late nineteenth century played an equally important role in the minds of their cosmopolitan rivals, who might have been expected to know better. Industrialism was in its infancy, and most people struggled to understand the meaning of its impact. In large part, accusations of conspiracy were simply the level upon which politics was played in the 1890s.

Although Populists chose economic policy as their battlefield, morality was their cause. They looked backward to an earlier moral order for their inspiration. Populists did recognize, however, that commercial and industrial society was a permanent part of the American landscape. Instead of engaging in a frenzy of Luddite retrogression, they attempted to address problems within the context of their morally based mind-set. They accepted industrialism but demanded that it be made humane. The adoption of many of their solutions in the twentieth century attests to the practicality of their reforms. Populists wanted both the benefits of industrialization and a moral social order.

Various scholars have noted the almost religious fervor of the Populist appeal. For many, the People's party replaced the church as a vehicle for moral expression. The apocalyptic vision of Populism, however, encouraged a drive for quick victory. Third party disciples believed that the crisis of the age was upon them in 1896. The result would be either civilization or barbarism. Desperation caused many of Populism's oldest and most noted leaders to temporize their positions and accept the pragmatism of fusion with Democrats. Those not disheartened by this transition from justice to expediency finally lost heart upon the defeat of William Jennings Bryan.

The nomination of Bryan for president in 1896 saved the Democratic party from going the way of the Whigs. Three major parties vied for the allegiance of the American electorate in the 1890s. If men like Grover Cleveland had controlled the Democratic party in 1896, the People's party could well have replaced it as the GOP's major rival. If the People's party had survived as a major force in the political life of the nation, the American electorate would have been presented with a continuing debate over its commitment to capitalism. Instead, the great political debate of twentieth-century America has been over how best to save capitalism.