Merrill Jensen
The Revolution as a Democratic Movement
The historian who ventures to talk about
democracy in early America is in danger because there are almost as many
opinions as there are writers on the subject. The Puritans have been pictured as
the founders of American democracy, and it is vigorously denied that they had
anything to do with it. Some have seen in Roger Williams the father of American
democracy, and others have denied that he was a democrat, whatever his putative
progeny may be. The conflict is equally obvious when it comes to the American
Revolution, and the problems of solution are far more complex than they are for
the seventeenth century. The difficulty is compounded, for all too often men's
emotions seem to become involved.
It is sometimes suggested that we avoid the use of the word "democracy" when
discussing the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It seems to me that this is
a flat evasion of the problem, for the Americans of those centuries used the
word and they meant something by it. Our task, then, is not to avoid the issue
but to try to understand what they meant, and understand what they meant in the
context of the times in which they lived. What we must not do is to measure the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in terms of our own assumptions about what
democracy is or should be. This is all the more important since many of us do
not seem to be too clear about our assumptions, even for the century in which we
live.
A
number of years ago I took the position that "in spite of the paradoxes involved
one may still maintain that the Revolution was essentially, though relatively, a
democratic movement within the thirteen American colonies, and that its
significance for the political and constitutional history of the United States
lay in its tendency to elevate the political and economic status of the majority
of the people.” And then, with a somewhat rhetorical flourish which I have
sometimes regretted but have not as yet withdrawn, I went on to say that "the
Articles of Confederation were the constitutional expression of this movement
and the embodiment in governmental form of the philosophy of the Declaration of
Independence.” One thing can be said for this statement at least: reviewers
read it and quoted it, some with raised eyebrows, and some with approval,
whether or not they said anything at all about the rest of the book.
During most of the present century historians have assumed that democracy was
involved somehow or other in the American Revolution. They have assumed also
that there were conditions within the American colonies that were not
satisfactory to at least some of the American people. The causes of internal
discontent were various, ranging all the way from religious to economic
differences. The discontent was of such intensity that in certain colonies it
led to explosive outbreaks in the 1760's such as the Regulator movements in the
Carolinas, the Paxton Boys' uprising in Pennsylvania, and the tenant farmer
revolt in New York, outbreaks that were suppressed by the armed forces of the
colonial governments and with the help of British power.
Most historians have agreed also that the
individual colonies were controlled politically by relatively small groups of
men in each of them, allied by family, or economic or political interests, or by
some combination of these. The colonial aristocracies owed their position to
many things: to their wealth and ability, to their family connections and
political allies, and to the British government which appointed them to office.
As opposed to Britain, they had won virtual self-government for the colonies by
1763. Yet in every colony they were a minority who managed to maintain internal
control through property qualifications for the suffrage, especially effective
in the growing towns, and through refusal or failure to grant representation in
any way proportional to the population of the rapidly growing frontier areas.
Probably more important than either of these was the fact that in most colonies
the aristocracies manned the upper houses of the legislatures, the supreme
courts, and other important posts--all by royal appointment. Beyond this, their
control extended down through the county court system, even in Massachusetts. In
short, colonial political society was not democratic in operation despite the
elective lower houses and the self-government which had been won from Great
Britain.
This is a brief but, I think, fair summary of a widely held point of view
concerning the political actualities at the beginning of the revolutionary era.
This view has been challenged recently. A writer on Massachusetts declared that
"as far as Massachusetts is concerned, colonial society and the American
Revolution must be interpreted in terms something very close to a complete
democracy with the exception of British restraints." It was not controlled by a
wealthy aristocracy. There was little inequality of representation, and property
was so widely held that virtually every adult male could vote} The assumption
that Massachusetts was an idyllic democracy, united in the fight against British
tyranny, will be somewhat surprising to those who have read the letters of
Francis Bernard and the diary of John Adams, not to mention the history of
Thomas Hutchinson, and, I suspect, would be even more surprising to those
gentlemen as well. Elsewhere, this writer has implied that what was true for
Massachusetts was probably true for other colonies and for the United States
after the Revolution.
On the other hand it is asserted that democracy
had nothing to do with the Revolution. Such an assertion made in connection with
Pennsylvania is a little startling, for ever since C. H. Lincoln's work of more
than a half century ago, down to the present, it has been held that there was a
democratic movement in Pennsylvania during the revolutionary era. Not so, says a
reviewer of the most recent study. He declares that "the attribution of
democratic motivations and ideas to eighteenth century colonists is a common
fault among many historians of the colonial period. . . ." He argues that the
struggle in Pennsylvania before 1776 was one between "radical and conservative
variants of whiggism," which he defines as one between "those who held privilege
most dear and those who valued property above all." The Pennsylvania
Constitution of 1776 itself was not democratic, but a triumph of "colonial
radical whiggism."
It is clear that a considerable diversity of
opinion prevails. It is also clear that the time has come to set forth certain
propositions or generalizations which seem to me to have a measure of validity.
First of all, a definition of democracy is
called for. And just to face the issue squarely, I will offer one stated at
Newport, Rhode Island, in 1641 when a meeting declared that "the government
which this body politic doth attend unto. . . is a democracy or popular
government; . . . that is to say: It is in the power of the body of freemen,
orderly assembled, or the major part of them, to make or constitute just laws,
by which they will be regulated, and to depute from among themselves such
ministers as shall see them faithfully executed between man and man." That such
an idea was not confined to Newport was shown six years later when the little
towns in Rhode Island formed a confederation, the preamble of which states: "It
is agreed, by this present assembly thus incorporate, and by this present act
declared, that the form of government established in Providence Plantations is
democratical; that is to say, a government held by the free and voluntary
consent of all, or the greater part of the free inhabitants."
These are simple but, I think, adequate
definitions. I will go even further and offer as a theoretical and philosophical
foundation for democracy the statement by Roger Williams in the Bloudy Tenent
of 1644. After describing civil government as an ordinance of God to
conserve the civil peace of the people so far as concerns their bodies and
goods, he goes on to say: "The sovereign, original, and foundation of civil
power ! lies in the people (whom they must needs mean by the civil power
distinct from the government set up). And if so, that a people may erect and
establish what form of government seems to them most meet for their civil
condition. It is evident that such governments as are by them erected and
established have no more power, nor for no longer time, than the civil power or
people consenting and agreeing shall betrust them with. This is clear not only
in reason, but in the experience of all commonweals where the people are not
deprived of their natural freedom by the power of tyrants.
The central issue in seventeenth-century New England was not social equality, manhood suffrage, women's rights, or sympathy for the Levellers, or other tests which have been applied. The central issue was the source of authority for the establishment of a government. The English view was that no government could exist in a colony without a grant of power from the crown. The opposite view, held by certain English dissenters in New England, was that a group of people could create a valid i government for themselves by means of a covenant, compact, or constitution. The authors of the Mayflower Compact and the Fundamental Orders of Connecticut operated on this assumption, although they did not carry it to the logical conclusion
and call it democracy as did the people in Rhode
Island. It is the basic assumption of the Declaration of Independence, a portion
of which reads much like the words of Roger Williams written 132 years earlier.
The second proposition is that colonial governments on the eve of the Revolution
did not function democratically, nor did the men who controlled them believe in
democracy. Even if we agree that there was virtually manhood suffrage in
Massachusetts, it is difficult, for me at least, to see it as a democracy. In
1760 the government was controlled by a superb political machine headed by
Thomas Hutchinson, who with his relatives and political allies occupied nearly
every important political office in the colony except the governorship. The
Hutchinson oligarchy controlled the superior court, the council, the county
courts, and the justices of the peace; with this structure of appointive office
spread throughout the colony, it was able to control the house of
representatives elected by the towns. For six years after 1760 the popular party
in Boston, led by Oxenbridge Thacher and James Otis, suffered one defeat after
another at the hands of the Hutchinson machine. The popular leaders in the town
of Boston tried everything from slander to mob violence to get control of the
government of the colony but it was not until after the Stamp Act crisis that
they were able to win a majority of the house of representatives to their side.
Even then, men like James Otis did not at first realize that the Stamp Act could
be turned to advantage in the fight against the Hutchinson oligarchy In terms of
political support between 1760 and 1765, if Massachusetts had a democratic
leader, that man was Thomas Hutchinson, a charge to which he would have been the
first to issue a horrified denial.
The third proposition is that before 1774 or 1775 the revolutionary movement was
not a democratic movement, except by inadvertence. The pamphleteers who wrote on
political and constitutional questions, and the town and county meetings and
legislatures that resolved endlessly between 1763 and 1774, were concerned with
the formulation of constitutional arguments to defend the colonies and their
legislatures from interference by parliament.
The colonial theorists wrote much about the
British constitution, the rights of Englishmen, and even of the laws of nature,
but they accepted the British assumption that colonial governments derived from
British charters and commissions. Their essential concern was with the
relationship that existed, or ought to exist, between the British government and
the colonial governments, and not with the relationship between man as man, and
government itself. Such writers showed no interest in domestic problems, and
when it was suggested that the arguments against taxation by parliament were
equally applicable to the taxation of under-represented areas in the colonies,
or to dissenting religious groups, such suggestions were looked upon as being
quite out of order.
The same indifference was displayed in the realm
of political realities. The ardent leaders of the fight against British policies
showed no interest in, or sympathy for, the discontent of back-country farmers
or religious groups such as the Baptists. Instead, they temporarily joined with
their political enemies to suppress or ignore it. Such sympathy as the
discontented got, they got from the British government, or from colonial leaders
charged with being tools of the British power.
The fact is that the popular leaders of the
revolutionary movement had no program of domestic reform. Instead, their program
was a combination of a continuous assault on the local office-holding
aristocracies and an ardent attack on British policies; and in the course of
time they identified one with the other. It is sometimes difficult to tell with
which side of the program the popular leaders were more concerned. In
Massachusetts, for instance, before 1765 they were so violent in their attack on
Hutchinson that they prevented Massachusetts from joining the other colonies in
making formal protests against British legislation.
The fourth proposition is related to the third.
It is that although the popular leaders in the colonies showed no interest in
internal political and social change, they were still able to build up a
political following, particularly in the seacoast towns. They were superb
organizers, propagandists with a touch of genius, and possessed of an almost
demonic energy in their dual fight against the local political aristocracies and
British policies. After a few false starts such as that of James Otis, who at
first called the Virginia Stamp Act Resolves treason, the popular leaders took
an extreme stand on the subject of colonial rights. The political aristocracies
might object to British policies, as most of them did, but considering what they
owed to British backing, they displayed an understandable caution, a caution
that made it impossible for them to pose as patriotic leaders.
The popular leaders were also willing to take extreme measures in practical
opposition to British policies, ranging all the way from mob violence to
nonimportation agreements forced upon unwilling merchants. And with ever more
force and violence they accused Americans who did not agree with them or their
methods of knuckling under to British tyranny and of readiness to sell the
liberties of their country for a little pelf. In the course of this campaign
they appealed to the people at large. Men who normally could not or did not take
part in political life, particularly in the cities, were invited to mass
meetings where the rules of suffrage were ignored and where they could shout
approval of resolutions carefully prepared in advance by their leaders. In
addition, the mob was a constant factor in political life, particularly in
Boston where it was efficiently organized. Mobs were used to nullify the Stamp
Act, to harass British soldiers, to hamper the operations of the customs
service, and to intimidate office holders.
All these activities on the part of the disfranchised, or the hitherto politically inactive, accustomed men to taking part in public affairs as never before; and it gave them an appetite for more. From the beginning of the crisis in 1774 onward, more and more "new men," which was the politest name their opponents called them, played an ever more active role, both on the level of practical politics and on the level of political
theory. They began writing about and talking about what they called "democracy." And
this was a frightening experience, not only to the conservative-minded leaders of the
colonies, but to many of the popular leaders as
well.
For instance, when a New York mass meeting gathered in May 1774 to answer the
letter of the Boston Town Meeting asking for a complete stoppage of trade with
Britain as an answer to the Boston Port Act, the people talked about far more
than letter writing. One alarmed observer wrote: "I beheld my fellow-citizens
very accurately counting all their chickens, not only before any of them were
hatched, but before above one half of the eggs were laid. In short, they fairly
contended about the future forms of our government, whether it should be founded
upon aristocratic or democratic principles." The leaders had "gulled" the mob
for years, and now, said Gouvemeur Morris, the mob was waking up and could no
longer be fooled. The only salvation for the aristocracy of New York was peace
with Britain at almost any price.
Another witness to the stirrings among the
people was John Adams. Unlike Gouvemeur Morris, he never wavered in his belief
in independence, but at the same time he was constantly concerned with the
danger of an internal upheaval. Years later in his "Autobiography," he recalled
as vividly as if it had happened the day before an event that took place while
he was home in Massachusetts in the fall of 1775. While there he met a man who
had sometimes been his client. "He, though a common horse jockey, was sometimes
in the right, and I had commonly been successful in his favor in our courts of
law. He was always in the law, and had been sued in many actions at almost every
court. As soon as he saw me, he came up to me, and his first salutation was,
'Oh! Mr. Adams, what great things have you and your colleagues done for us! We
can never be grateful enough to you. There are no courts of justice now in this
province, and I hope there never will be another.'" Then Adams goes on: "Is this
the object for which I have been contending? said I to myself, for I rode along
without any answer to this wretch. Are these the sentiments of such people, and
how many of them are there in the country? Half the nation for what I know; for
half the nation are debtors, if not more, and these have been, in all countries,
the sentiments of debtors. If the power of the country should get into such
hands, and there is great danger that it will, to what purpose have we
sacrificed our time, health, and everything else? Surely we must guard against
this spirit and these principles, or we shall repent of all our conduct."
In May of 1776, with the talk of independence
filling the air and the Virginia convention planning to draft a constitution,
old Landon Carter of Virginia wrote to Washington bewailing the "ambition" that
had "seized on so much ignorance allover the colony as it seems to have done;
for this present convention abounds with too many of the inexperienced creatures
to navigate our bark on this dangerous coast. . . ." As for independence, he
said, "I need only tell you of one definition that I heard of Independency: It
was expected to be a form of government that, by being independent of the rich
men, every man would then be able to do as he pleased. And it was with this
expectation they sent the men they did, in hopes they would plan such a form.
One of the delegates I heard exclaim against the Patrolling Law, because a poor
man was made to pay for keeping a rich man's slaves in order. I shamed the fool
so much for it that he slunk away; but he got elected by it."
One could go on endlessly giving examples like these from the hectic days between 1774 and 1776, examples of the fear among leaders of all shades of opinion that the people would get or were getting out of hand. Meanwhile there was an increasing amount of political writing in the newspapers, writing which was pointing in the direction of independence and the creation of new governments in America. More than a year before Common Sense, a piece which appeared first in the Pennsylvania Packet declared that "the history of kings is nothing but the history of the folly and depravity of human nature." "We read now and then, it is true, of a good king; so we read likewise of a prophet escaping unhurt from a lion's den, and of three men walking in a fiery furnace without having even their garments singed. The order of nature is as much inverted in the first as it was in the last two cases. A good king is a miracle."
By early 1776 the debate over future governments to be adopted was in full swing. Disliking intensely the ideas of government set forth in Common Sense, John Adams drafted his Thoughts on Government. His plan was modeled on the old government of Massachusetts, with an elective rather than a royal governor, of course, but certainly contemplated no radical change in the political structure. John Adams was no innovator. He deplored what he called "the rage for innovation" which had appeared in
Massachusetts by June of 1776. The projects,
said he, are not for repairing the building but for tearing it down. " The
projects of county assemblies, town registers, and town probates of wills are
founded in narrow notions, sordid stinginess, and pro- found ignorance, and tend
directly to barbarism."
There was equal alarm in the south at demands
for change and new governments. Among those who sought to defend the old order
was Carter Braxton. In a long address to the Virginia convention he praised the
British constitution and declared that it would be "perverting all order to
oblige us, by a novel government to give up our laws, our customs, and our
manners." The spirit of principles of limited monarchy should be preserved. Yet,
he said, we daily see it condemned by the advocates of "popular governments. . .
. The system recommended to the colonies seem to accord with the temper of the
times, and are fraught with all the tumult and riot incident to simple
democracy. . . ." Braxton declared that democracies would not tolerate wealth,
and that they could exist only in countries where all the people are poor from
necessity. Nowhere in history could he find an example of a successful
democracy. What he proposed for Virginia was a three-part government with a
house of representatives elected by the voters for three years. The house, in
turn, would choose a governor to serve during good behavior and a council of
twenty-four to hold their places for life and to act as an upper house of the
legislature. Braxton in Virginia, like John Adams in Massachusetts, hoped to
make the transition from dependence to independence without any fundamental
political change.
But change was in the air, and writer after
writer sought to formulate new ideas about government and to offer concrete
suggestions for the theoretical foundations and political structures of the new
states to be. In 1775, on hearing that congress had given advice to New
Hampshire on the establishment of a government, General John Sullivan offered
his thoughts to the revolutionary congress of his colony. All government, he
wrote, ought to be instituted for the good of the people. There should be no
conflicting branches in imitation of the British constitution "so much
celebrated by those who understand nothing of it. . . ." The two houses of the
legislature and a governor should all be elected by the people. No danger can
arise to a state "from giving the people a free and full voice in their own
government." The so-called checks upon the licentiousness of the people "are
only the children of designing or ambitious men, no such thing being necessary.
. . ."
In the middle colonies appeared an address "To
the People of North America on the Different Kinds of Government." After
defining monarchy, aristocracy, oligarchy, and democracy, the anonymous writer
said: "Popular government--sometimes termed democracy, republic, or
commonwealth--is the plan of civil society wherein the community at large takes
the care of its own welfare, and manages its concerns by representatives elected
by the people out of their own body."
"Seeing the happiness of the people is the true end of government; and it appearing by the definition, that the popular form is the only one which has this for its object; it may be worth inquiring into the causes which have prevented its success in the world."
This writer then undertakes to explain the failure of former democracies. First
of all, he says that past republics tried democracy too late and contained
within them remnants of aristocracies and military cliques which disliked it. A
second cause was that men did not have adequate knowledge of representation and
that their large and tumultuous assemblies made it possible for unscrupulous men
to charge all troubles to the constitution. A third cause of failure has been
the political writers who from ignorance or ulterior motives have tried to
discredit democracy. "This has been carried to such a length with many, that the
mentioning a democracy constantly excites in them the idea of anarchy; and few,
except such as have emancipated themselves from the shackles of political
bigotry and prejudice, can talk of it with patience, and hearken to anything
offered in its defence." Such are the causes of the destruction of former
republics, but the Americans have the best opportunity ever open to mankind to
form a free government, "the last and best plan that can possibly exist."
In "The Interest of America," another writer says that new governments must soon
be created in America and that "the good of the people is the ultimate end of
civil government." Therefore, "we should assume that mode of government which is
most equitable and adapted to the good of mankind. . . and I think there can be
no doubt that a well-regulated democracy is most equitable." The annual or
frequent choice of magistrates is most likely to prevent usurpation and tyranny;
and most likely to secure the privileges of the people. Legislatures should be
unicameral for a plurality of branches leads to endless contention and a waste
of time.
In New England, where the revolutionary
congresses of Massachusetts and New Hampshire were controlled by leaders along
the seacoast, there was a growing discontent among the people of the
back-country counties. Out of it came one of the clearest democratic statements
of the times: "The People are the Best Govemors." The author starts with the
premise that "there are many very noisy about liberty, but are aiming at nothing
more than personal power and grandeur." "God," he said, "gave mankind freedom by
nature, and made every man equal to his neighbor, and has virtually enjoined
them to govern themselves by their own laws." Representatives in legislatures
should have only the power to make laws. They should not have power to elect
officials or to elect councils or senates to veto legislation. Only the people
have this power. If there must be senates, they should be elected by the people
of the state at large and should have only advisory powers. Representation
should not be according to taxable property, for "Nature itself abhors such a
system of civil government, for it will make an inequality among the people and
set up a number of lords over the rest." Representation according to population
also has its difficulties. The solution is for each town to have one
representative, with more for larger towns if the legislature thinks fit. So far
as property qualifications for representatives are concerned, there should be
none. "Social virtue and knowledge. . . is the best and only necessary
qualification of the person before us." If we have property qualifications "we
root our virtue; and what will then become of the genuine principle of freedom?"
"Let it not be said in future generations that money was made by the founders of
the American states an essential qualification in the rulers of a free people."
The writer proposed annual elections of a one-house legislature, of a governor,
and of the judges of the superior court. The people in the counties should elect
annually all their own officials-judges, sheriffs, and others-as should the
inhabitants of the towns. And in all elections "any orderly free male of
ordinary capacity" should have the right to vote if he has lived in a town for a
year.
From such discussions one may sum up certain of
the essential ideas. (1) They agree that the "good" or the "happiness" of the
people is the only end of government. (2) They agree that "democracy" is the
best form of government to achieve that end. (3) They show a distrust of men
when in power--a distrust shared with far more conservative-minded writers of
the times.
As to details of government there are variations, but they do agree on
fundamentals. (1) The legislatures, whether one or two houses, are to be elected
by the people. (2) Public officials, state and local, are to be elected by the
people or by their representatives in the legislatures. (3) There should be
annual elections. (4) Some argue for manhood suffrage, and one writer even
advocated that tax-paying widows should vote. (5) There should be freedom of
religion, at least for Protestants; in any case, freedom from taxation to
support established churches.
One may well ask: did such theoretical
discussions have any meaning in terms of practical politics, or were they idle
speculations by anonymous writers without influence? The answer is that they did
have meaning. I have already cited the discussion of the principles of
government in New York in the spring of 1774, and the litigious jockey in
Massachusetts in 1775 who hoped that the courts would remain closed forever.
These are not isolated examples. By the end of 1775 all sorts of organized
activity was under way, ranging in place from North Carolina to New Hampshire,
and from militia groups to churches.
In North Carolina the defeat of the Regulators
in 1771 had not ended discontent but merely suppressed it. By September 1775
Mecklenburg County was instructing its delegates in the provincial congress to
work for a plan of government providing for equal representation and the right
to vote for every freeman who supported the government, either in person or
property. Legislation should not be a "divided right"; no man or body of men
should be "invested with a negative on the voice of the people duly collected. .
. ." By November 1776, when North Carolina elected a congress to write its first
state constitution, Mecklenburg County was even more specific in its
instructions. It told its delegates that they were to endeavor to establish a
free government under the authority of the people of North Carolina, and that
the government was to be a "simple democracy, or as near it as possible." In
fixing fundamental principles, the delegates were to "oppose everything that
leans to aristocracy or power in the hands of the rich and chief men
exercised to the oppression of the poor....
In the middle colonies militia organizations
made demands and suggestions. Pennsylvania was in turmoil, with the assembly
controlled by the opponents of independence and the revolutionary party
working in large measure through a voluntary militia organization called the
Associators. In February 1776 a committee of privates from the
Philadelphia Associators told the assembly "that it has been the practice of
all countries, and is highly reasonable, that all persons. . . who expose
their lives in the defense of a country, should be admitted to the
enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of a citizen of
that country. . . ." All Associators should be given the right to vote.
In June the committee of privates again
protested to the legislature. This time they denied the right of the
assembly to appoint two brigadier generals for the Associators as recommended by
the Continental Congress. The privates declared that since many of them
could not vote, they were not represented in the assembly. Furthermore, many
counties where the Associators were most numerous did not have proportional
representation. And for that matter, since many members of the assembly
were members of a religious profession "totally averse to military
defense," they could not possibly be called representatives of the
Associators.
While such ideas were being expounded in
Pennsylvania, some militia in Maryland were proposing a new constitution. There
was a growing discontent in Maryland with the revolutionary convention which was
opposed to independence, and whose members were appointing one another to
military posts. Government by convention should stop, said one writer, and
regular government be instituted.
Late in June 1776 disputes from the militia battalions in Anne Arundel County met and proposed a constitution to be submitted to the people of the county. They started out with the declaration that the right to legislate is in "every member of the community," but that for convenience the right must be delegated to representatives chosen by the people. The legislature must never form a separate interest from the community at large, and its branches must "be independent of and balance each other, and all de- pendent on the people." There should be a two-house legislature chosen annually ''as annual elections are most friendly to liberty, and the oftener power reverts to the people, the greater will be the security for a faithful discharge of it." All provincial officials, including judges, should be elected annually by joint ballot of the two houses. All county officials should be chosen annually by the people of each county. Nothing is said of property qualifications for either voting or office-holding. So far as taxes are concerned, "the unjust mode of taxation by poll" should be abolished, and all monies raised should be according to a fair and equal assessment of people's estates.
In New Jersey the revolutionary congress, like
that in other colonies, was trying to prevent change and was maintaining the
land qualification for voting for its members. But the complaints grew so loud
that it was forced to yield. One petition in 1776, for instance, declared that
"we cannot conceive the wise author of our existence ever designed that a
certain quantity of earth on which we tread should be annexed to a man to
complete his dignity and fit him for society. Was the sole design of government
either the security of land or money, the possession of either or both of these
would be the only necessary qualifications for its member. But we apprehend the
benign intentions of a well regulated government to extend to the security of
much more valuable possessions-the rights and privileges of freemen, for the
defense of which every kind of property and even life itself have been liberally
expended."
In Massachusetts the Baptists were quick to draw
a parallel between the fight for civil liberty against England and their own
fight to religious liberty. Baptists were being jailed for refusal to pay taxes
to support churches. Their leader, the Reverend Isaac Backus, put Sam Adams
squarely on the spot in January 1774, "I fully concur with your grand maxim,"
wrote Backus, "that it is essential to liberty that representation and taxation
go together." Hence, since the representatives in the Massachusetts legislature
have only civil qualifications, how can they levy ecclesiastical taxes? "And I
am bold in it," Backus goes on, "that taxes laid by the British Parliament upon
America are not more contrary to civil freedom, than these taxes are to the very
nature of liberty of conscience. . . ." He hopes, he says, that Adams will do
something about it so that a large number of peaceable people "may not be forced
to carry their com- plaints before those who would be glad to hear that the
legislature of Massachusetts deny to their fellow servants that liberty which
they so earnestly insist upon for themselves. A word to the wise is sufficient….
Samuel Adams was not interested in liberty of conscience, particularly for
Baptists, and he did not reply. But Backus pursued him to the first Continental
Congress in Philadelphia where a four-hour meeting Was held in Carpenter's Hall
one night. The Massachusetts delegation met with the Baptists, but with a large
audience present, among whom were the Quaker leaders James and Israel Pemberton,
and members of congress like Joseph Galloway. The Backus diary gives a picture
of Sam and John Adams quite literally squirming as the Baptists cited the facts
of religious life in Massachusetts. One can well imagine with what delight
Galloway and the Pembertons looked on as the Massachusetts delegation vainly
tried to wriggle out of a dilemma produced by the contradiction between their
theory and their practice.
The Declaration of Independence was taken seriously by many Americans, or at least they found its basic philosophy useful in battling for change in the new states. Nowhere was this done more neatly than in Grafton County, New Hampshire. The Provincial Congress was in the control of eastern leaders and they refused to grant representation that the western towns thought adequate. In calling elections in the fall
of 1776, the Congress grouped various towns together for electing
representatives and told them that the men they elected must own real estate
worth £200 lawful money. Led by professors at an obscure little college at
Hanover, the people of Grafton County went on strike. They refused to hold
elections, and town after town met and passed resolutions. The whole procedure
of the Congress was unconstitutional. No plan of representation had been adopted
since the Declaration of Independence. By the Declaration, said Hanover and two
other towns in a joint statement, "we conceive that the powers of government
reverted to the people at large, and of course annihilated the political
existence of the Assembly which then was. . . ." Six other towns joined together
and declared it to be "our humble opinion, that when the declaration of
independency took place, the Colonies were absolutely in a state of nature, and
the powers of government reverted to the people at large. . . ." Such being the
case, the Provincial Congress has no authority to combine towns, each of which
is entitled to representation as a corporate entity. And it has no right to
limit the choice of representatives to the owners of £ZOO, said the people of
Lyme, because "every elector in free states is capable of being elected."
It seems clear, to me at least, that by 1776
there were people in America demanding the establishment of democratic state
governments, by which they meant legislatures controlled by a majority of the
voters, and with none of the checks upon their actions such as had existed in
the colonies. At the same time there were many Americans who were determined
that there should be no changes except those made inevitable by separation from
Great Britain.
The history of the writing of the first state
constitutions is to a large extent the history of the conflict between these two
ideals of government. The conflict can be exaggerated, of course, for there was
considerable agreement on structural details. Most of the state constitutions
worked out in written form the structure of government that had existed in the
colonies, all the way from governors, two-house legislatures, and judicial
systems, to the forms of local government. In terms of structure, little that is
revolutionary is to be found. Even the much maligned unicameral legislature of
Pennsylvania was only a continuation of what Pennsylvania had had since the
beginning of the century.
The significant thing is not the continuity of
governmental structure, but the alteration of the balance of power within the
structure, and in the political situation resulting from the break away from the
supervising power of a central government- that of Great Britain.
The first and most revolutionary change was in
the field of basic theory. In May 1776, to help bring about the overthrow of the
Pennsylvania assembly, the chief stumbling block in the way of independence,
Congress resolved that all governments exercising authority under the crown of
Great Britain should be suppressed, and that "all the powers of government [be]
exerted under the authority of the people of the colonies. . . ." John Adams
described it as "the most important resolution that ever was taken in America.
The Declaration of Independence spelled it out in terms of the equality of men,
the sovereignty of the people, and the right of a people to change their
governments as they pleased.
Second: the Revolution ended the power of a
sovereign central government over the colonies. Britain had had the power to
appoint and remove governors, members of upper houses of legislatures, judges,
and other officials. It had the power to veto colonial legislation, to review
cases appealed from colonial supreme courts, and to use armed force. All of this
superintending power was wiped out by independence.
Third: the new central government created in America by the Articles of Confederation was, in a negative sense at least, a democratic government. The Congress of the United States had no power over either the states or their citizens. Hence, each state could govern itself as it pleased, and as a result of some of the new state constitutions, this often meant by a majority of the voters within a state.
Fourth: in writing the state constitutions,
change was inevitable. The hierarchy of appointed legislative, executive, and
judicial officials which had served as a check upon the elective legislatures
was gone. The elective legislature became the supreme power in every state, and
the lower houses, representing people however inadequately, became the dominant
branch. The appointive houses of colonial times were replaced by elective
senates, which in theory were supposed to represent property. They were expected
to, and sometimes did, act as a check upon the lower houses, but their power was
far less than that of pre-war councils.
Fifth: the office of governor underwent a real
revolution. The governors of the royal colonies had, in theory at least, vast
powers, including an absolute veto. In the new constitutions, most Americans
united in shearing the office of governor of virtually all power.
Sixth: state supreme courts underwent a similar
revolution. Under the state constitutions they were elected by the legislatures
or appointed by governors who were elected officials. And woe betide a supreme
court that tried to interfere with the actions of a legislature.
What such changes meant in terms of political
realities was that a majority of voters within a state, if agreed upon a program
and persistent enough, could do what it wanted, unchecked by governors or courts
or appeals to a higher power outside the state.
There were other areas in which changes took place,
although they were only beginnings. A start was made in the direction of ending
the property qualification for voting and office-holding. A few states
established what amounted to manhood suffrage, and a few years later even women
voted in New Jersey although that was stopped when it appeared that woman
suffrage meant only a means of stuffing ballot boxes. A few states took steps in
the direction of representation according to population, a process as yet
unsolved in the United States. A large step was taken in the direction of
disestablishing state churches, but on the whole one still had to be a
Protestant, and a Trinitarian at that, to hold office.
In connection with office-holding, there is one eighteenth-century American idea
that is worthy of a whole study by itself, and that is the concept of rotation
in office. Many Americans were convinced that office-holding bred a lust for
power in the holder. Therefore there must be frequent, if not annual, elections;
and there must be a limitation on the time one might spend in certain offices.
There is probably no more remarkable self-denying ordinance in the history of
politics than the provision in the Articles of Confederation that no
man could be a member of Congress more than three years out of any
six. I have often been accused of wanting to go back to the Articles
of Confederation, which is nonsense, but there are times when I do wish that
this one provision might be revived in the twentieth century.
What I have done in this paper is to set before you some of the reasons for believing that the American Revolution was a democratic movement, not in origin, but in result. Certainly the political leaders of the eighteenth century thought the results were democratic. Whether they thought the results were good or bad is another story.